

## Northwest Model United Nations 2008

November 7-9, 2008, Seattle, WA



WWW.NWMUN.ORG

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the 2008 Northwest Model United Nations (NWMUN) Conference, as well as to the Security Council. My name is Nicholas Carlson, and I will be the President of the Security Council for the duration of this conference. I first wish to thank you for your interest in our conference and this committee. We appreciate your support and hope that you will find your experience enjoyable and rewarding. NWMUN 2008 will mark the beginning of my tenth year of involvement in Model United Nations. In 2002, I entered the University of Washington, where I double-majored in International Studies and Political Science, along with Germanics for a while. The campus MUN program was rather new but growing at the time, so I joined and served in the high school conference organization, the Washington State Model United Nations (WASMUN) for the next three years, becoming its Secretary-General in 2005. I served as an advisor the following year, and then went to London to earn my Master of Science in International Public Policy. Upon my return to the States in 2007, I rejoined the UW team, this time on the collegiate side, and participated in three conferences as a member of Model United Nations at the University of Washington.

The topics for this year's Security Council are:

1. Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development
2. Review of SC Resolution 1325

Every participating delegation is required to submit a position paper prior to attending the conference. NWMUN will accept position papers via e-mail until **Wednesday, November 5<sup>th</sup>**. Please refer to the Delegate Preparation Guide and the sample position paper on the NWMUN website for position paper requirements and restrictions. Delegates' adherence to these guidelines is crucial to ensure a well-prepared committee and open information on the policy and views of member States.

This guide will be your *first* resource prior to the conference. You should find it informative but by no means authoritative. You will have to conduct research on your own if you are to gain a sufficient understanding of the agenda topics and your State's policies. In the Security Council, it will be obvious who did this and who did not, so I urge you to make a strong effort. That will improve the simulation for all of us. If you have questions about anything related to the simulation, please address them to me as soon as possible. Again, thank you for your interest. I look forward to an invigorating Security Council simulation come this autumn.

Sincerely,

Nicholas Carlson  
President, Security Council  
Northwest Model United Nations 2008

## Committee History

The Security Council, established in 1945, is one of the principal organs of the United Nations as defined by Article 7 of the United Nations Charter. Chapter V of the Charter defines the composition and role of the Security Council, namely:

*In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.<sup>1</sup>*

This is a fairly broad mandate, which has expanded considerably since the end of the Cold War to include unprecedented peacekeeping missions, human rights monitoring, counter-terrorism measures, and most recently even mitigation of the consequences of climate change. While reform of the Security Council is still a contentious issue, its centrality to the harmony of the international system has ensured that it retains a relatively high degree of relevance.

Due to its preeminent position in the United Nations, the Security Council is the only organ comprised of voting delegates whose resolutions can be considered legally binding. There is debate as to what extent Security Council decisions are binding. For example, it is generally accepted that anytime Chapter VII of the Charter is invoked (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”), the resolutions are indeed binding. However, most of the Council’s work falls under Chapter VI (“Pacific Settlement of Disputes”), in which case the Council may be seen to be merely advisory in its resolutions and not legally binding. The potential for alternative interpretations within the international community should thus be remembered by delegates drafting resolutions.

The Security Council has five permanent members—the People’s Republic of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—each with veto power. This means that if one of these Member States votes “No” on a substantive motion (meaning a resolution or an amendment), the motion is not passed. Vetoes are used sparingly, however, especially since the end of the Cold War,<sup>2</sup> so delegates representing permanent members should not be overly eager to wield what is considered an undiplomatic and even provocative instrument.

The Security Council also has ten non-permanent members—currently Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Libya, Panama, South Africa, and Vietnam. Five of these members are elected each year for two-year terms by the General Assembly, and are divided between the geographical regions of the world to ensure a more equitable distribution of the seats. They are considered regional representatives and expected to take regional views into consideration during the course of their membership. Each Member State has one vote, and passage of any motion requires nine votes in favor; on substantive motions such as resolutions, passage must also gain either approval or abstention from each of the five permanent members.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>“United Nations Charter, Chapter V, Article 24”. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

<sup>2</sup>“Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council”. Global Policy Forum. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/data/vetotab.htm>

<sup>3</sup>“United Nations Charter, Chapter V, Article 27”. United Nations. <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html>

The Security Council has its own rules, which will be incorporated into our simulation.<sup>4</sup> The rules regarding the agenda and the Presidency of the Council will be ignored, however, to accommodate our simulation and NWMUN rules of procedure. Delegates should consider the following Security Council rules in particular:

- Rule 28, regarding the appointment of commissions and rapporteurs
- Rule 37, regarding invitations to non-Council delegates to sit with the Council
- Rule 38, regarding proposals from non-Council members
- Rule 39, regarding invitations to the Secretariat and other individuals to address the Council

***Membership of the Security Council***

Belgium  
Costa Rica  
Indonesia  
Panama  
United Kingdom

Burkina Faso  
Croatia  
Italy  
Russian Federation  
United States

China  
France  
Libya  
South Africa  
Viet Nam

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<sup>4</sup> "Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council". United Nations. <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/scrules.htm>

## **I. Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development**

### ***Introduction***

GUAM, also known as the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development,<sup>5</sup> was established in 1997 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (and briefly Uzbekistan) as one of several cooperative organizations among the former Soviet republics. The organization has “A conceptual vision of GUAM, primarily based on cooperation between the Member States in creating [a] Euro-Asian Trans-Caucasus transport corridor...extended to create a common space of integration and security in the GUAM region.”<sup>6</sup> Its specific objectives are mostly socioeconomic in nature—as the formal name of the organization suggests—but do include “strengthening international and regional security and stability,” even though “GUAM is not directed against anyone” and officially neutral.<sup>7</sup>

The GUAM area, however, is rife with some of the world’s most controversial security issues that involve peoples within the members’ defined borders as well as their international neighbors. The four “conflicts” are located in Transnistria (in eastern Moldova), Nagorno-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan), and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both in northern Georgia). They have evolved from the break-up of the Soviet Union, which left the borders of the new republics ambiguous and ethnic groups divided and displaced by borders that did not reflect their geographic location. Although the conflicts share a similar background, they are otherwise quite different from each other; this has made a regional solution elusive.

While GUAM has the recognition of the United Nations (it has had official observer status there since 2003) and is in the process of developing and strengthening its institutions, it is itself incapable of resolving the conflicts. The individual Member States, while unified in philosophy and intent, have by necessity been required to handle their respective conflicts (Ukraine excepted as it is not directly involved in any of them) more or less on their own, or with the assistance of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and specifically Russia.

GUAM does, however, increasingly speak with one voice in international forums. This is particularly evident at the United Nations, where in regard to subjects ranging from global warming to antiterrorism, representatives from GUAM states have spoken on behalf of the others. As a bloc, they have most notably pressed for inclusion in the General Assembly’s agenda the topic of “Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development.” The effort began prior to the 62<sup>nd</sup> Session of the General Assembly (2007-2008) and was unusual in that it faced organized opposition led by the Russian Federation. In fact, the initial attempt failed, and the GUAM States had to appeal to the entire General Assembly Plenary for the topic’s inclusion in the agenda.<sup>8</sup> This attempt narrowly succeeded, and the topic was added to the General Assembly’s agenda.<sup>9</sup> Thus, GUAM’s desire for more United Nations involvement in the security issues of the region began to be realized, though no resolution dealing directly with the topic was passed during the session.

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<sup>5</sup> GUAM’s English website homepage is <http://www.guam.org.ua/en.phtml>.

<sup>6</sup> “GUAM—Organization for Democracy and Economic Development”. GUAM.  
<http://www.guam.org.ua/211.501.0.0.1.0.phtml>

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> A/BUR/61/SR.1. *Adoption of the agenda and allocation of items*. United Nations.  
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/517/05/PDF/N0651705.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>9</sup> A/61/PV.2. *Organization of work, adoption of the agenda and allocation of items*. United Nations.  
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/520/25/PDF/N0652025.pdf?OpenElement>.

## Case Study: Abkhazia and South Ossetia



Georgia's two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, serve as examples of the kind of issues the GUAM countries would like to elevate peacefully into international discourse. Both were, for many years, frozen conflicts that threatened to thaw into wider war, and neither were solved by the efforts of the parties, or GUAM, alone. Moreover, GUAM's inability to create diplomatic movement on these issues helped contribute to the environment that sparked the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia.

Ossetians have been a distinct ethnic enclave residing in the same area for generations. While many speak Georgian or Russian, Ossetian is considered the official language of the proposed breakaway republic.<sup>10</sup> The majority of Ossetians are Christian, as are the majority of Georgians.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, Ossetians identify more closely with Russia than with Georgia; indeed, they have been historically persecuted by Georgians for their connection to Moscow.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> "Regions and Territories: South Ossetia." British Broadcasting Corporation. July 23, 2008.

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country\\_profiles/3797729.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3797729.stm)

<sup>11</sup> Reeve, R. (2006, January). The OSCE Mission to Georgia and the Georgian-Ossetian conflict: An overview of activities. Helsinki Monitor, 17(1), 57-68.

<sup>12</sup> *Supra*, note 1.



As the Soviet Union dissolved and Georgia declared its independence, Ossetia took up its own struggle for independence, resulting in clashes between Ossetia and Georgia. A January 19, 1992, referendum on independence was rejected by the international community, as it was not recognized by Georgian authorities.<sup>13</sup> Hostilities continued until the June 1992 Sochi Ceasefire Agreement, which established a Joint Council Commission (JCC) to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate negotiations.<sup>14</sup> The resulting peacekeeping force was divided into three divisions: Georgian troops to oversee the Georgian areas of Ossetia, Ossetians to administer their own areas, and Russians to oversee the mixed areas.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> *Supra*, note 2.

<sup>14</sup> "The United States and the South Ossetian Conflict." United States Department of State. March 31, 2008.

<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/102834.htm>

Also see: "The Georgian-Ossetian Conflict." Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. n.d.

<http://www.osce.org/georgia/22955.html>

<sup>15</sup> *Supra*, note 2.

This agreement worked generally well (though without significant progress in negotiating a resolution) until Summer 2004, when Georgia's new President, Mikhail Saakashvili, promised a rededication to resolving the conflict. Most visibly, this meant an increase in Georgian troops inside South Ossetia, which increased tension and resulted in a string of kidnappings, beatings, and minor skirmishes until an August 2004 ceasefire.<sup>16</sup> In response, Saakashvili proposed a JCC-directed peace plan that would eventually result in autonomy, though not independence, for the Ossetians.<sup>17</sup> The plan was endorsed by several international bodies, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but has not yet led to any agreements between Georgia and the Ossetians. On November 12, 2006, a referendum on independence held inside the disputed territory was approved with over 90% of the vote, but the results were dismissed by the international community for being unsanctioned.<sup>18</sup>

The conflict remained mostly stable from then until an August 2008 clash between Georgian and South Ossetian soldiers led to a regional crisis, and then an invasion by Russian forces.<sup>19</sup> The Russian military quickly took control of South Ossetia and entered Georgian territory, where they advanced to the major city of Gori, on the way to the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. Eventually, a French-brokered peace deal largely halted the advance, though, as of the time of this writing, Russian forces have not completely withdrawn.<sup>20</sup> Instead, residual forces have solidified their positions around key cities inside Georgia and erected permanent checkpoints in an effort to create 'buffer zones' around the breakaway regions.<sup>21</sup>

Georgia's concerns are two-fold. First, they are striving to keep their territorial integrity intact. Just as importantly, though, they are attempting to break free of Russia's sphere of influence, and that rift is creating tension in the region. In South Ossetia, Georgia specifically objects to the influence of Russia, who has aided the breakaway government, provided military advisors, and kept troops in the territory under the initial peacekeeping agreement.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, as of the time of this writing, Russian troops have superseded the previous peacekeeping force.<sup>23</sup> Likewise, Russia is concerned by the dissolution of its previous sphere of influence, and has objected strenuously to Georgia's overtures to NATO and other Western bodies.<sup>24</sup> This tension has fueled the conflict in South Ossetia and created additional impediments to its resolution. It has also threatened to spill into war on several occasions, particularly in the 2007 and 2008 shootings-down of spy planes over Abkhazia.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> "Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia." International Crisis Group. November 26, 2004.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3128&l=1>

<sup>17</sup> "Georgia unveils Settlement Offer." British Broadcasting Corporation. January 26, 2005.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4209243.stm>

<sup>18</sup> Michael Schwartz. "South Ossetia Finds Independence Drive Lonely." New York Times. November 13, 2006.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/13/world/europe/13russiansumm.html?scp=1&sq=south%20ossetia%20referendum&st=cse>

<sup>19</sup> Margarita Antidze. "Georgia, S. Ossetia talk war after 6 die in clash." Reuters. August 2, 2008.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSL279875.CH..2400>

<sup>20</sup> "A Georgian-Russian Peace Deal and the French Connection." Stratfor. August 13, 2008.

[http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical\\_diary/georgia\\_russia\\_peace\\_deal\\_and\\_french\\_connection](http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/georgia_russia_peace_deal_and_french_connection)

<sup>21</sup> "Tbilisi: Russian troops hold Georgian checkpoints." CNN. August 23, 2008.

<http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/23/russia.georgia.withdrawal/index.html>

<sup>22</sup> "Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly." International Crisis Group. June 7 2007.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4887&l=1>

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Supra*, note 2.

<sup>25</sup> "Russia Says Rebels Downed Plane." British Broadcasting Corporation. April 22 2008.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7360864.stm>

Such events have bled into stable conflict zones, and threaten to spark war, as in South Ossetia. In particular, the presence of Russian troops inside the conflict zone makes negotiations more complex and the slightest incident fraught with catastrophe. The resolution of these and similar conflicts, like the Azeri-Armenian tensions, require engagement with GUAM's neighbors, because GUAM Member States have been largely unsuccessful in resolving them. For example, GUAM's official response to this action was limited to a press conference led by the Georgian Ambassador to Ukraine.<sup>26</sup> Instead, they have turned to other international organizations, such as NATO (which Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova have all expressed interest in joining), OSCE, the General Assembly and the Security Council for help, as the GUAM countries did in 2006.<sup>27</sup>

### ***UN and Member States' Involvement***

The United Nations has limited its involvement in the GUAM area since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly have even formally discussed Transnistria or South Ossetia, let alone taken action on them. Nagorno-Karabakh has received quite limited attention; The Security Council's most recent resolution was SC/Res/884 on 12 November 1993, and though three other resolutions were also passed in 1993, none have been passed in the intervening 15 years.<sup>28</sup> The General Assembly has taken a greater interest more recently, with resolution 62/243 being passed this year at the behest of the GUAM states, although not during discussion of the GUAM Area agenda topic.<sup>29</sup> The situation in Abkhazia, however, has garnered the most attention of the four conflicts.

The Security Council was sufficiently alarmed in 1993 by reports of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia during the post-Soviet separatist war that it sent to the Abkhaz-Georgian border the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) authorized by Security Council Resolution 849 (9 July 1993).<sup>30</sup> It has renewed UNOMIG every year since then, most recently in Security Council Resolution 1808 (15 April 2008).<sup>31</sup> Several of the resolutions renewing the mission have also praised the CIS peacekeeping force that has worked in concert with UNOMIG. Together, and in concert with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the close involvement of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), efforts have been made to keep the peace and promote reconstruction and development in Abkhazia.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, a serious outbreak of violence has not occurred since the 1993-1994 war, although tensions remain quite high.

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<sup>26</sup> "Press conference on the aftermath of Russian-Georgian conflict." GUAM News. August 19, 2008.

<http://www.guam.org.ua/204.1179.0.0.1.0.phtml>

<sup>27</sup> Nikola Krastev. "UN: GUAM Brings Frozen Conflicts to World Stage." Global Security. September 27, 2006.

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/09/mil-060927-rfer102.htm>

Also see: Janusz Bugajski. "Nato Enlargement and Membership." Center for Strategic and International Studies. January 17, 2007. [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0701\\_wiltonpark.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0701_wiltonpark.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> Security Council Resolutions 874, 853, and 822.

<sup>29</sup> A/RES/62/243. *Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan*. United Nations.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/478/35/PDF/N0747835.pdf?OpenElement>. Refer also to A/RES/60/285 and 48/114.

<sup>30</sup> S/RES/849. *On implementation of the cease-fire and dispatch of military observers to Abkhazia, Georgia*. United Nations. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/393/04/IMG/N9339304.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>31</sup> S/RES/1808. *On settlement of Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and extension of the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)*. United Nations.

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/306/29/PDF/N0830629.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>32</sup> "OSCE Mission to Georgia". OSCE. <http://www.osce.org/georgia/>.



While the Security Council has passed forty resolutions related to the situation in the GUAM area since 1993, the General Assembly has only passed one resolution that does not relate to the financing of UNOMIG.<sup>33</sup> A/RES/62/249 (29 May 2008) concerned the right of return of refugees (mostly ethnic Georgians) to Abkhazia.<sup>34</sup> This action was also supported by the GUAM states, but again was not drafted during discussion of the GUAM area topic. The General Assembly has been otherwise constrained by the precedence of the Security Council on agenda topics related to this region, as they are generally viewed as issues related to international peace and security and therefore subject to the Security Council's rights of discussion and action on such topics.

### ***Recent Developments and Conclusion***

For the "Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development" topic, the GUAM states introduced a draft resolution during the 62<sup>nd</sup> Session.<sup>35</sup> This effort failed, but it indicates a willingness by GUAM to assert more influence at the United Nations in the face of apathy and opposition, the latter especially by the Russian Federation. As evidenced by the recent full-fledged conflict in Georgia, conflict anywhere within the GUAM States pose a threat to the stability of the entire region. With the presence of large States, and complex ethnic and religious divides, the conflict must be addressed delicately and diplomatically.

<sup>33</sup> The complete list is S/RES/1808, 1781, 1752, 1716, 1666, 1656, 1615, 1582, 1554, 1524, 1494, 1462, 1427, 1393, 1364, 1339, 1311, 1287, 1255, 1225, 1187, 1150, 1124, 1096, 1077, 1065, 1036, 993, 971, 937, 934, 906, 901, 896, 892, 881, 876, 858, 854, and 849.

<sup>34</sup> A/RES/62/249. *Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia*. United Nations. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/478/71/PDF/N0747871.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>35</sup> "Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development". GUAM. <http://www.guam.org.ua/229.991.0.0.1.0.phtml>

## II. Review of SC Resolution 1325

*“Resolution 1325 holds out a promise to women across the globe that their rights will be protected and that barriers to their equal participation and full involvement in the maintenance and promotion of sustainable peace will be removed. We must uphold this promise.”*<sup>36</sup>

### ***Introduction***

SC/RES/1325, passed on October 31, 2000, sought to tackle issues relating to women and security in several areas: increasing women’s involvement in security issues, reducing the persecution and exploitation of women during conflicts, and ensuring that a gender perspective is included in all aspects of conflict reconstruction. These issues had been addressed in various international documents in the past, most notably the Beijing Platform of Action, but Resolution 1325 was the first document to apply those concepts in a structured way to peacekeeping operations with the force of the Security Council.

### ***Background***

In 1994, the world watched in horror as Rwandans turned on each other in a particularly gruesome ethnic cleansing. The violence sparked by these atrocities spiraled throughout the region for the better part of a decade. Women, constrained by rapidly disintegrating traditional societies and victimized by the lawlessness of war, carried an especially heavy burden. An estimated 60,000 women were raped during the Rwandan conflict. In other conflicts, the toll on women is similarly high; 40,000 women were raped during the conflicts in Bosnia.<sup>37</sup> Often, these rapes were tools of intimidation or a means of ensuring cooperation; in other cases, they were simply symptomatic of the systematic denigration and humiliation of the enemy.<sup>38</sup>

In some instances, raped women were deliberately infected with HIV or threatened with infection.<sup>39</sup> Some Bosnian women raped were held in captivity until their pregnancies came to term – forcing them to give birth and making the child a symbol of their persecution.<sup>40</sup> These tactics can also serve strategic purposes, such as in Bosnia, where systematic rapes perpetrated by Serbian forces were intended to drive non-Serbians from their homes.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> United Nations Secretary General, *Women, Peace and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2002.

<sup>37</sup> “Rape in war ‘a growing problem.’” British Broadcasting Corporation. June 22, 2006.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5105102.stm>

<sup>38</sup> Jeanne Ward and Mendy Marsh. “Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in War and Its Aftermath: Realities, Responses, and Required Resources.” Government of Belgium and the European Commission. June 2006.  
<http://www.unfpa.org/emergencies/symposium06/docs/finalbrusselsbriefingpaper.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph. “Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity.” *SAIS Review*. 1994. 82-99. <http://www.hrw.org/women/docs/rapeinwar.htm>

After rape, many of these women were stigmatized by society and their own families, suffering discrimination and rejection for the war tactics practiced against them.<sup>42</sup> As conflicts settled into ceasefire or peace, economies often are not yet re-established and women in these zones – including those who were raped – often found little means to rebuild their lives and were forced to turn to prostitution. Moreover, this environment, with weakened or destroyed community structures, often creates a fertile market for sex trafficking.<sup>43</sup> By 2001, seven years after the initial conflict in Bosnia ended, experts estimated that 5,000 trafficked women were in the State's borders at all times.<sup>44</sup> United Nations efforts and other relief interventions into these conflicts were also marred with problems. Violent groups that look to continue or exacerbate conflicts targeted women living in refugee camps as they sought water, firewood and other necessities outside the boundaries of the camps. Moreover, UN peacekeepers were often involved in the exploitation of women: during the 1992-1993 UNTAC Mission to Cambodia, peacekeeper interest led to a quadrupling of the number of prostitutes; similar behavior was documented in the Balkan peacekeeping missions.<sup>45</sup> Such activity undermined the efforts of the peacekeepers, and ensured that the victimization of women continued.

### ***Tenets of Security Council Resolution 1325***

In 2000, at the conclusion of a decade of incredible peacekeeping activity – almost 80,000 peacekeeping forces on the ground at times, with a 600% increase in peacekeeping operations compared with the 1980s – the Security Council took its first comprehensive steps to address this issue.<sup>46</sup> SC/RES/1325 tackled the issue directly, laying the framework for a “gender-sensitive approach” to future peacekeeping missions.<sup>47</sup>

First, the Security Council urged Member States and UN bodies to increase the participation level of women throughout their respective peacekeeping and security apparatuses.<sup>48</sup> This integration addresses several issues. It aids in the creation of more opportunities for women, who have not traditionally held prominent roles in most States' security and defense bureaucracies. Second, these women will carry with them a gender perspective that can help inform policymaking in the fields of security and defense. This perspective will, with time, inform both strategic and tactical policies, particularly in the areas of human rights and humanitarian assistance. Finally, these practices open doors to gender equality in peace negotiations. Of course, the success depends on the positions women are allowed to take; accordingly, the resolution specifically calls for women in field-based and operational roles, where they can directly impact events on the ground. The Secretary-General is directed to take the lead in integrating women into security positions in operative clause 3.

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<sup>42</sup> “‘My Heart is Cut.’ Sexual Violence by Rebels and Pro-Government Forces in Côte d’Ivoire.” Human Rights Watch. August 2007. <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/cdi0807/7.htm>

<sup>43</sup> “Because I am a girl: In the shadow of war 2008. Plan International.” May 15, 2008. [http://www.plan-international.org/pdfs/BIAAG\\_2008\\_english.pdf](http://www.plan-international.org/pdfs/BIAAG_2008_english.pdf)

<sup>44</sup> David Binder. “Country report: Bosnia.” *MSNBC*. 2001. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3071976/>

<sup>45</sup> Angela Mackay. “Sex and the Peacekeeping Soldier: the new UN Resolution.” *Peacenews*. Summer 2001. <http://www.peacenews.info/issues/2443/mackay.html>

<sup>46</sup> “DPKO List of Operations.” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. n.d. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf>;

“DPKO Peacekeeping Chart.” United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. n.d. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/chart.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> Martin Andjaba, quoted in: SC/6939. *Security Council Concludes Open Debate on Women and Peace And Security*. United Nations Security Council. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001025.sc6939.doc.html>

<sup>48</sup> S/RES/1325. *Resolution 1325*. United Nations Security Council.

Women will not constitute the majority of any State's military or peacekeeping force overnight, however. Therefore, as representatives of the UN, SC/RES/1325 dictates that peacekeepers should adhere to a standardized set of training guidelines outlining the limits of their behavior and best practices to achieve the goals of the peacekeeping operation.<sup>49</sup> Training peacekeeping forces on the challenges women face in conflict zones is particularly important, as it helps instill in troops a respect for victims and raises their awareness of activities specifically targeting women. Additionally, the HIV-awareness training included for peacekeepers can help mitigate the stigma attached to the disease, and stop peacekeepers from spreading it further themselves as well.

The first two emphasis areas of the resolution focus on capacity building measures within the UN System and Member States, but they stop short of addressing the plight of women in conflict zones or in post-conflict reconstruction. The challenges facing women in these areas are numerous, but, as the resolution urges, they can be mitigated by adherence to international law during wartime and by the inclusion of women and a gender perspective in peace negotiations.<sup>50</sup> International law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, outlaws the use of rape and protects the rights of civilians during wartime, including women.<sup>51</sup> Including women in peace negotiations heightens the chance that the ensuing peace will accommodate the special needs of women during repatriation and reintegration into society and creates roles for women in post-conflict civil society. Additionally, establishing an equal gender footing during negotiations lays the groundwork for equality in the resulting post-conflict society. Finally, the resolution specifically notes that peace treaties should exclude rape from any amnesty clauses.<sup>52</sup>

Despite drawing on a long tradition of international law, the conclusions of SC/RES/1325 were challenged. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that "women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."<sup>53</sup> The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) established a framework for ensuring equal rights and protection for women.<sup>54</sup> The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)'s 2000 Optional Protocol Regarding Children and Armed Conflict (CRCOPAC) protects children from being forcibly recruited into participating in armed conflict.<sup>55</sup> These landmark agreements, reinforced by several other documents, created a foundation of law and allowed Namibia to initiate Security Council discussion on the topic through their Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective.<sup>56</sup> The Plan of Action served as a framework for Resolution 1325. However, Russia and China both contend that the resolution addresses issues beyond the Council's competence.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, op. 6.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, op. 8-9.

<sup>51</sup> *Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*. United Nations General Assembly. October 21, 1950.

<sup>52</sup> S/RES/1325. *Resolution 1325*. United Nations Security Council.

<sup>53</sup> *Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*. United Nations General Assembly. October 21, 1950.

<sup>54</sup> *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women*. United Nations General Assembly. September 3, 1981.

<sup>55</sup> *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts*. United Nations General Assembly. February 12, 2002.

<sup>56</sup> S/2005/693. *Windhoek Declaration*. United Nations Security Council.

<sup>57</sup> "The UN Security Council Marks Seventh Anniversary of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security with Open debate." American Society of International Law. December 17, 2007.  
<http://www.asil.org/insights/2007/12/insights071217.html>

### ***Recent International Efforts***

The resolution has had some success in influencing international security. Several peacekeeping operations, including UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNTAET in Timor-Leste, and UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea include gender sensitivity lessons in their peacekeeper training.<sup>58</sup> The mandate for UNOB in Burundi and UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire specifically include in their mandates the integration of a gender perspective into peacekeeping.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, 25% of Security Council resolutions since 2000 have addressed gender issues as a component of the issue at hand; this is up from less than 4% before 1325.<sup>60</sup>

Several States have also created Action Plans to ensure compliance with the resolution. For example, Denmark's Action Plan has prompted its military to include gender-aware directives in its decision-making process. As this approach permeated the State's national security apparatus, Denmark's policymakers began introducing gender-based perspectives in their dealings with other international institutions, including the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).<sup>61</sup>

However, significant progress still needs to be made. The UN System itself has not transformed to allow for women in security positions. By 2006, less than 30% of staff members in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations were women, with similar numbers reported from the Department of Disarmament and UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.<sup>62</sup> Less than half of the current peacekeeping missions included a high-level gender advisor.<sup>63</sup> The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, which advocates greater incorporation of Resolution 1325 into the Council's day-to-day operations, has compiled an analysis of UNSC resolutions showing how infrequently a gender perspective is included in their work.<sup>64</sup> Even when Resolution 1325 is referenced in UNSC resolutions, it is not always implemented. This is most notable in the Peace Building Commission, which has virtually no structural mechanisms to implement a gender-based perspective in its activities.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> S/RES/1545. *Resolution 1545*. United Nations Security Council.

S/RES/1528. *Resolution 1528*. United Nations Security Council.

<sup>60</sup> "The UN Security Council Marks Seventh Anniversary of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security with Open debate." American Society of International Law. December 17, 2007. <http://www.asil.org/insights/2007/12/insights071217.html>

<sup>61</sup> "From Local to Global: Making Peace Work for Women – Security Council Resolution 1325 Five Years On Report." The NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. 2006. <http://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-fiveyearson.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> "The Status of Women in the United Nations." United Nations, Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women. March 2006. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/factshefinal21mar06.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> S/2007/567. *Report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security*. United Nations Security Council.

<sup>64</sup> "Security Council 1325 Monitor." Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. n.d. [http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325\\_Monitor/countryindex.htm](http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325_Monitor/countryindex.htm)

<sup>65</sup> "SCR 1325 and the Peacebuilding Commission." NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. October 25, 2006. <http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-sixyearson.pdf>

Nonetheless, the Council has at times recognized these failings and taken action to resolve them. Most recently, the Council passed SC/RES/1820, an update to and reaffirmation of Resolution 1325 that recognizes sexual violence as a war crime.<sup>66</sup> In this context, Resolution 1820 established a “zero tolerance” policy in regards to sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeepers, and encouraged gender perspective training courses for peacekeepers.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, it reiterated earlier requests for the Peace Building Commission to include gender perspective in its decision making and encouraged the inclusion of women in conflict-related negotiations and discussions. Finally, it requested a status report from the Secretary-General by June 30, 2009 on the implementation of its provisions.<sup>68</sup>

### ***Case Study: Burundi***

Burundi serves as an example of a State in which many of the principles of SC/RES/1325 have been implemented and a great deal of success achieved. The Republic of Burundi is a former German and Belgian colony that gained its independence in 1962.<sup>69</sup> The population of the small, landlocked State was estimated to be around 8.3 million in 2007, with the overwhelming majority of the total population, around 85%, identifying themselves as part of the Hutu ethnic group, 14% as Tutsi, and 1% as Twa.<sup>70</sup> Located in Central Africa and bordered by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania, the State has been experiencing a “cycle of ethnic and political violence” that began in the 1960s and continues to this day.<sup>71</sup> The current situation was triggered by the 1993 assassination of the first elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndaday.<sup>72</sup> This assassination was part of a wave of violence in which around 300,000 people died in the months surrounding the election.<sup>73</sup> In the two years following the assassination, the United Nations and other members of the international community tried to assist Burundi in establishing a government which would distribute power equally among the largest political parties.<sup>74</sup>

This endeavor failed in 1996 when a “Tutsi-dominated military coup” established Pierre Buyoyo as President, which prompted the establishment of the first UN mission in Burundi (ONUB) that same year as a way to monitor the situation.<sup>75</sup> Over the years, the mandate of ONUB was expanded beyond just maintaining peace and security, to include support and help in implementing the “efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation.”<sup>76</sup>

Following the establishment of Buyoyo as President, neighboring countries established economic sanctions on the State in an attempt to force the government to “return to constitutional order” and stop the violence which was spilling across its borders.<sup>77</sup> It wasn’t until these sanctions were lifted that Burundi was willing to begin the peace process; this process was finally initiated in July 1998.<sup>78</sup> The Arusha peace process was facilitated by ex-Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and attended by a total of 17 different political parties in the first round of talks.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> S/RES/1820. *Resolution 1820*. United Nations Security Council.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> International Crisis Group, *Conflict History: Burundi*, 2006.

<sup>70</sup> United States Department of State, *Burundi*, 2008.

<sup>71</sup> United Nations, United Nations Operation in Burundi. *Burundi*, 2006.

<sup>72</sup> Anderlini, *Women at the Peace Table: Making a Difference*, 2000.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>76</sup> United Nations, United Nations Operation in Burundi. *Burundi*, 2006.

<sup>77</sup> Anderlini, *Women at the Peace Table: Making a Difference*, 2000.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

Civil society was barred from participation in the process, prompting women across the state, both Hutu and Tutsi, to organize and protest the exclusion of civil organizations, which effectively excluded women, from the talks.<sup>80</sup> At a sub-regional meeting of women's organizations in Uganda, the delegates from Burundi asked for, and received the "endorsement" of the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, to become participants, not just bystanders, in the peace process.<sup>81</sup> President Nyere was supportive and sympathetic of the women's goals, but was forced to give the women's organizations temporary observer status after noting to the women that "your own brothers from Burundi will not accept your participation."<sup>82</sup> Despite this opposition, over the next few months, the women's organizations gained international, national, and local support in their efforts, drawing attention to their cause and rallying women throughout Burundi.<sup>83</sup> In 2000, after years of exclusion, the women's groups succeeded in raising enough awareness to prompt the chief facilitator of the peace talks, Nelson Mandela, to invite a group of UN experts to "discuss integrating women and women's rights into the peace process" and also "advise on gender issues and the importance of including women in peace and development processes."<sup>84</sup>

This briefing prompted the convening of a parallel conference later that year with 50 delegates from the 19 political parties, called the All-Party Burundian Women's Peace Conference. The conference aimed to "discuss gender concerns in Burundi's peace process and generate a set of recommendations for conference participants to present to their male counterparts participating in the official peace talks."<sup>85</sup> In July 2000, the parallel conference concluded by expressing "their support for the Arusha Peace Accord and their disapproval of women's very late inclusion in the peace process."<sup>86</sup> The recommendations of the conference included the establishment of "legal mechanisms to eliminate gender-based discrimination and impunity for gender-based war crimes; establishing quotas to ensure that at least 30% of government offices are held by women; ensuring increased protection for women and child refugees; and guaranteeing women's rights to property, land and inheritance."<sup>87</sup> The majority of the women's proposals did end up in the Arusha Peace Accord, with the exceptions including the quota of 30% of women in the government.<sup>88</sup> The Executive Director of UNIFEM, Noeleen Heyzer, "praised the Arusha accord as one of the strongest in recognizing the centrality of women's rights."<sup>89</sup> The success of the women's organizations in making an impact on the political landscape is the 2002 election in Burundi, the results of which saw 16 women elected to their Transitional Assembly.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> Strickland & Duvvury, *Gender Equity and Peacebuilding, From Rhetoric to Reality: Finding the Way*, 2003.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> Strickland & Duvvury, *Gender Equity and Peacebuilding, From Rhetoric to Reality: Finding the Way*, 2003.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

Building off of the local and national support of women's inclusion in peacebuilding efforts, UNIFEM launched a training program in 2007 to "strengthen the capacity of local leaders to restore women's role in transitional justice, and to enhance their understanding of women's rights and gender equality norms."<sup>91</sup> The worry is that although women have had great success in the peacebuilding process in Burundi, once the process has ended, women will once again be sidelined; thus, programs such as this aim to "reinstate positive norms and values native to Burundi" that disappeared following the colonization of the State.<sup>92</sup> Currently, many such programs are reaching out to women, as well as men, in attempts to make them partners in achieving gender equality for all.<sup>93</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

The disparity in implementation illustrates the difficulty in enacting such a fundamental change in international security practices. The resistance to this change has allowed discriminatory and illegal practices to continue, and, in some cases, flourish. Nonetheless, the international community has collectively recognized the problem, and is slowly creating the structural frameworks required to address it. SC/RES/1325 provided a broad foundation upon which Member States can build their own policies, thereby creating a structure and an urgency without which many States would have been unable or unwilling to take any action.

The explicit recognition of rape and other sexual violence as war crimes in SC/RES/1820 cemented the international consensus on the question. Furthermore, SC/RES/1820 took concrete steps toward further UN-directed action in raising the discussion on gender issues, ensuring that action would be taken throughout the world instead of in a few select countries that have the resources and political will to address the issue.

As delegates conduct research on this topic, it is requested that they keep the following questions in mind:

1. Are there any significant components to the inclusion of women and a gender perspective in international security that have been neglected?
2. Have the UNSC's actions in this field been sufficient? If not, what more could be done? Look for concrete steps, but be cognizant of the UN's limited resources.
3. In what ways can a gender perspective be effectively included in the Peace Building Commission's activities?
4. Does your State have a Plan of Action for implementing 1325? If so, are there any strategic elements missing from the plan? If there is no plan, what impediments have blocked the creation of one in your State?

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<sup>91</sup> United Nations Development Fund for Women, *UNIFEM Currents 2007, 2007*.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*